Dollarization in El Salvador and Ecuador: a model worth following? by Moran, Benjamin P.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis and Dissertation Collection
2016-03
Dollarization in El Salvador and Ecuador: a model
worth following?
Moran, Benjamin P.














Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
DOLLARIZATION IN EL SALVADOR AND ECUADOR: 








Thesis Advisor:  Robert E. Looney 
Second Reader: Laura R. Adame 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
i 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB 
No. 0704–0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection 
of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork 
Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 




3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Master’s thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
DOLLARIZATION IN EL SALVADOR AND ECUADOR: A MODEL 
WORTH FOLLOWING? 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S)  Benjamin P. Moran
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Naval Postgraduate School 










11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
This thesis explores de jure dollarization in El Salvador and Ecuador. “De jure dollarization” is the 
wholesale transition from using a country’s national currency to using another country’s currency as its 
own legal tender. This thesis looks at the histories of El Salvador and Ecuador in order to set the stage for 
the conversion to the U.S. dollar. It then looks at select macroeconomic indicators in both countries to 
determine if dollarization has been a beneficial policy decision for each country. The data suggests that 
dollarization has been a prudent choice for El Salvador and Ecuador. While the macroeconomic success of 
both countries cannot be wholly attributed to dollarization, it has enabled both countries to have low, 
stable inflation rates and interest rates that have contributed to positive macroeconomic outcomes. Since 
this thesis approaches dollarization from a macroeconomic viewpoint, additional research should focus on 
how dollarization has affected various socioeconomic classes in these societies on a more microeconomic 
level. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS




















NSN 7540–01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 
 ii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
iii 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
DOLLARIZATION IN EL SALVADOR AND ECUADOR: A MODEL WORTH 
FOLLOWING? 
Benjamin P. Moran 
Major, United States Air Force 
B.S., United States Air Force Academy, 2005 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 
(WESTERN HEMISPHERE) 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
March 2016 
Approved by: Robert E. Looney 
Thesis Advisor 
Laura R. Adame 
Second Reader 
Mohammed M. Hafez 
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs 
 iv 




This thesis explores de jure dollarization in El Salvador and Ecuador. “De jure 
dollarization” is the wholesale transition from using a country’s national currency to 
using another country’s currency as its own legal tender. This thesis looks at the histories 
of El Salvador and Ecuador in order to set the stage for the conversion to the U.S. dollar. 
It then looks at select macroeconomic indicators in both countries to determine if 
dollarization has been a beneficial policy decision for each country. The data suggests 
that dollarization has been a prudent choice for El Salvador and Ecuador. While the 
macroeconomic success of both countries cannot be wholly attributed to dollarization, it 
has enabled both countries to have low, stable inflation rates and interest rates that have 
contributed to positive macroeconomic outcomes. Since this thesis approaches 
dollarization from a macroeconomic viewpoint, additional research should focus on how 
dollarization has affected various socioeconomic classes in these societies on a more 
microeconomic level. 
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Exchange rate regimes come in many different forms. The United States’ choice 
of regime is called a “floating system.” Other popular systems are fixed-rate regimes, 
currency board systems, and systems where there is no sovereign currency; instead the 
country uses another country’s currency as its own.1 This last type of system is 
commonly referred to as “dollarization.” While the name implies that the U.S. dollar is 
used as the replacement currency, it is not necessary to use the U.S. dollar for the policy 
to be termed “dollarization.” Hence, a country could choose to use the British pound or 
the Japanese yen and it would still be considered dollarization. Additionally, there is a 
difference between a country officially using another country’s currency as its own and a 
country where a second currency is widely used and accepted as if it were the national 
legal tender. The former is called de jure dollarization. The latter is termed de facto 
dollarization. This thesis uses the term “dollarization” to mean de jure dollarization—
officially adopting the U.S. dollar as the sovereign currency. 
This thesis explores some of the reasons why Ecuador and El Salvador chose to 
dollarize. The motivation behind a major decision such as getting rid of one’s national 
legal tender could help in understanding why that policy choice was taken and what the 
desired outcome was. A better understanding of these two countries’ motivations will 
help answer whether or not a similar policy would be beneficial for other countries in the 
region. Furthermore, a closer look at the economic factors involved in dollarization could 
help predict if such a path is prudent for other governments. By examining these two 
dollarization cases, this thesis can potentially add to the scholarship available on whether 
or not dollarization should be pursued. If it can be shown that dollarization has been 
beneficial for these two countries then a stronger case can be made to other similar 
countries to do likewise. If dollarization has not had the desired favorable outcomes that 
the policy makers had hoped for, then this too will benefit other countries in warning 
them to pursue other exchange rate regimes in lieu of dollarization. 
                                                 
1 Roberto Chang and Andres Velasco, “Financial Fragility and the Exchange Rate Regime,” Journal of 
Economic Theory 92 (2000): 4. 
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Therefore, the major research question for this thesis is, given the macroeconomic 
performance of El Salvador and Ecuador since their decision to dollarize their national 
currencies, should other countries, especially in Latin America, adopt similar policies? 
Accordingly, this thesis explores the histories of El Salvador and Ecuador and possible 
reasons why they dollarized. Additionally, this thesis delves into the economic 
performance of both countries prior to dollarization and after implementation to try and 
ascertain the level of success in adopting the dollar as the national currency.  
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
As mentioned earlier, there are various schools of thought on the types of 
exchange-rate regimes that a particular country can implement. On one extreme a country 
could decide to use what is called a floating exchange rate. In a floating system, the value 
of a particular currency is determined by supply and demand in the world currency 
exchange market in relation to other currencies.2 In other words, each day the value could 
change; that is why it is said to “float.” For example, today perhaps 1 U.S. dollar might 
be equal to 1 Euro; tomorrow 1 U.S. dollar might be worth 1.25 Euros. The other extreme 
is termed a fixed exchange rate, with the most rigid of these being dollarization. The 
basic idea with a fixed exchange rate is that a country will choose to “peg” its currency to 
another currency. The two most popular currencies to fix to are the U.S. dollar and the 
Euro.3 Arguably, the most common reason to fix one currency to another is for trade.4 A 
country that can fix its currency to another one can ensure that prices are stable for trade 
that occurs between it and its partners. A stable price simplifies trade between two 
countries and also can cause an increase in trade due to the stability in the transactions.5 
Normally, in a fixed exchange rate regime, a country keeps its sovereign currency and 
                                                 
2 Reem Heakal, “Currency Exchange: Floating Rate vs. Fixed Rate,” Investopedia, November 26, 
2003, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/03/020603.asp.  
3 Kimberly Amadeo, “What Is a Peg to the Dollar?” About News, accessed August 31, 2015, 
http://useconomy.about.com/od/glossary/g/dollar-peg.htm.  
4 Andrew K. Rose, “One Money, One Market: The Effect of Common Currencies on Trade,” 
Economic Policy 15, no. 30 (2000), 9. 
5 Andrew Berg and Eduardo Borensztein, “The Pros and Cons of Full Dollarization,” IMF Working 
Paper WP/00/50, International Monetary Fund (2000): 14–15. 
 3 
buys or sells the currency it is fixed to in order to keep its own currency at a 
predetermined exchange rate vis-à-vis the other. 
Dollarization takes the fixed exchange rate one step further. Instead of a country 
maintaining its own currency, the country opts to completely replace its currency with 
another one, usually the dollar. So then, a country begins to use dollars, or whatever 
currency it has chosen, as its legal tender for all transactions. This change can be 
unilateral in nature, meaning the country changes its currency to the dollar without 
official approval from the United States.6 The transition can also be negotiated through a 
treaty or a monetary union, such as the European Union did when it created the Euro.7 
This second method is more involved and certainly a lengthier process. 
1. For Dollarization 
In reviewing the literature on dollarization, there are proponents for it, but there 
are also those that oppose it. The advocates cite various reasons why dollarization could 
be a positive step. One of these is the possibility of increasing trade between countries, as 
with a fixed exchange rate. Rose has even shown that trade partners that use the same 
currency trade up to three times as much as those that do not share a currency.8 One of 
the reasons trading has the potential to increase between countries with the same currency 
is due to the reduced transaction costs.9 Neither country has to convert its currency to 
another in order to make its trades, thereby simplifying the process and eliminating any 
transaction fees associated with converting one currency into another. When multiplied 
over thousands of transactions, it is easy to see how trade between two countries can 
benefit from using the same currency.  
Related to the idea of costs associated with converting currency is the concept of 
exchange rate risk. Exchange rate risk is the risk assumed when someone using one 
                                                 
6 Roberto Chang, “Dollarization: A Scorecard,” Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Review 
(Third Quarter, 2000), 2. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Rose, “One Money, One Market,” 9. 
9 Morris Goldstein, Managed Floating Plus: The Great Currency Regime Debate (Washington, DC: 
Institute for International Economics, 2002), 34–36. 
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currency wants to invest in something that uses a different currency. The risk in this 
transaction is due to the chance that the exchange rate between the two currencies will 
become less favorable for the investor, hence reducing the value of the investment. If the 
investor is using the same currency as the one in which the investment is denominated, 
however, then the exchange rate risk disappears. Investors then, theoretically, will be 
more willing to invest their money where they assume less risk.10  
Still another currency conversion issue mentioned in the literature is currency 
mismatching.11 Currency mismatching happens when a country has its assets and 
liabilities denominated in different currencies. If the exchange rate between those two 
currencies changes then the country’s net worth can change significantly.12 Clearly, if the 
country does not mismatch but instead has all of its assets and liabilities denominated in 
the same currency then there is no opportunity for the net worth to change. This particular 
advantage of dollarization should be considered since as Goldstein points out, “currency 
mismatching, via devaluation, is often regarded as at the heart of the large output losses 
observed during many currency crises.”13 
Similar to currency mismatching are currency outflows and speculative attacks. 
Currency outflows are simply when investors choose to move their money out of 
investments in a country for some reason. A common cause for this is when a country 
devalues its own currency. In these cases investors may shift investments elsewhere, 
causing a currency outflow. A speculative attack, on the other hand, is a devaluation of 
currency caused by outside investors hoping to profit from the falling value of the 
domestic currency. When a country uses a fixed exchange rate, but not dollarization, it 
can be susceptible to a speculative attack. Dollarization helps to prevent both issues since 
a country cannot devalue another’s currency and speculators do not have a domestic 
currency to attack.14  
                                                 
10 Goldstein, Managed Floating Plus, 34–36. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Chang, “Dollarization: A Scorecard,” 8. 
13 Goldstein, Managed Floating Plus, 35. 
14 Berg and Borensztein, “The Pros and Cons of Full Dollarization,” 13–15. 
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Moreover, dollarization proponents argue that a country will benefit from faster 
growth rates and increased foreign investment. Faster growth is expected because of the 
coupled effect of low inflation risk and no domestic devaluation risk. These low risks, in 
turn, are thought to increase savings, lower interest rates, and increase foreign 
investment. Additional factors that may increase foreign investment are signaling effects 
of adopting a dollarization policy. By dollarizing, a government is signaling that it is 
serious about its commitment to low inflation, fiscal responsibility, and transparency. 
These types of commitments are encouraging to cautious investors.15 
Two final advantages the literature discusses are reduced borrowing costs and 
budget discipline. Dollarization can result in reduced borrowing cost for a government 
for some of the reasons already discussed, such as transaction costs and currency risk. A 
bank issuing a loan to a dollarized country assumes less risk than a bank that lends to a 
country with its own domestic currency. Since there is less risk for the bank, the overall 
borrowing costs are reduced to the particular country. Finally, a government in a 
dollarized economy cannot simply print money on a whim. Accordingly, budget makers 
must be more disciplined on where money gets allocated. In theory, wasteful spending on 
inefficient programs or buying votes with the budget cannot be sustained when the ability 
to print money is gone. This in turn should lead to an overall strengthening of the 
economy since the government is forced to stick to a budget.16 
2. Against Dollarization 
The most common criticism of dollarization in the literature is the loss of 
seigniorage the particular government would experience. Seigniorage simply is the 
profits a country generates from selling its currency minus the cost to produce it. Since 
the cost to produce currency is substantially lower than the face value of the currency, 
then the government stands to make a respectable profit from seigniorage. Switching to a 
dollarization regime would negate any further seigniorage profits. Not only would future 
profits be eliminated, but prior gains would be diminished as well. In order for a country 
                                                 
15 Berg and Borensztein, “The Pros and Cons of Full Dollarization,” 13–15. 
16 Goldstein, Managed Floating Plus, 36. 
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to fully dollarize it has to buy back all of its own currency that is in circulation and 
replace it with the new currency. This mass buyback could potentially erase any previous 
seigniorage gains. Therefore, previous and future seigniorage benefits cannot be relied 
upon when dollarizing.17  
Another common critique of dollarization in the literature is the loss of the lender 
of last resort function. “Lender of last resort” is when a central bank steps in to bail out a 
domestic bank that has fallen on hard times and does not have the necessary cash on hand 
to stay in business. This sort of scenario can happen if there is a run on the bank by its 
customers. A bank could find itself lacking the funds demanded by its patrons. If this 
happens, usually a central bank can step in and print money to loan to the bank in 
question. Under a dollarization scheme, however, the ability of the central bank is 
severely limited, namely since the central bank cannot print the currency in circulation. 
With proper forethought and planning, the central bank can respond to small crises of this 
kind. One way is through setting aside a liquid fund that could be used at a time like this. 
Another way is to secure a foreign line of credit that could be called upon in a time of 
crisis. Both of these options carry a cost with them. While this cost could be calculated, it 
is specific to each case and thus cannot be generalized. Therefore, the ability of the 
central bank to act as a lender of last resort could be severely hampered, or nonexistent, 
under a dollarization regime.18 
Another common criticism of dollarization in the literature is the government’s 
lack of independent monetary policy. Monetary policy is important to a government 
because it allows a proactive approach to dealing with inflation and recessions.19 
Precisely how much the government should intervene in its economy is constantly 
debated. The fact remains that governments using their own currency have monetary 
policy and act in ways that they consider best at the time, given what is known about a 
situation. With dollarization, however, a particular country must essentially adopt, or at 
                                                 
17 Berg and Borensztein, “The Pros and Cons of Full Dollarization,” 15–18. 
18 Chang, “Dollarization: A Scorecard,” 5–6; Berg and Borensztein, “The Pros and Cons of Full 
Dollarization,” 21–23. 
19 Jim Eggert, What Is Economics? (Houston: Mayfield Publishing Company, 1987), 129–147. 
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least accept, the monetary policy of the country where the currency originates. The lack 
of independent monetary policy might be insignificant some of the time, but when 
something like an asymmetric shock, or some other factor, de-synchronizes the two 
countries, the dollarizing country may wish it had the option to exercise more control 
over its own monetary policy.20 
The next point the literature agrees on is the permanency of dollarizing. Switching 
from one currency to another is not an overnight prospect. It takes time to convert an 
economy to another currency. Once switched over, there seems to be no easy way to 
revert back to the old system. Indeed, even if a country dollarized and then decided to go 
back to a sovereign currency, the new currency would undoubtedly be seen as weak 
compared to the dollar. Additionally, ensuring people give up dollars for the new 
currency is almost impossible. In such a case, de facto dollarization would most likely 
persist even though it is not the official policy. Moreover, no country has fully dollarized 
and subsequently reversed the policy.21 Given the many challenges of implementing 
dollarization and the even more challenges to reverse dollarization, it is clear that 
dollarization is a long term plan.22 
A final black mark for dollarization is more political than economic, namely the 
loss of identity or national pride due to the eradication of the national currency. National 
symbols can play a substantial part in uniting people under a common identity. Some 
symbols that come to mind are a country’s flag, its national anthem, even its national 
museums. Another symbol that may not always be considered is the national currency. 
The U.S. currency, and most other nations’ currencies, incorporates various symbols and 
historical figures on the paper or coins. This serves to remind citizens of their heritage 
and their unity and thus reinforces the national identity. Currency not only brings citizens 
together on a cognitive level, but it brings citizens together in a literal sense because it 
                                                 
20 Goldstein, Managed Floating Plus, 37; Barry Eichengreen, “When to Dollarize,” Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking, 34, no.1 (February 2002):17–24. 
21 Lodewyk Erasmus, Jules Leichter, and Jeta Menkulasi, “Dedollarization in Liberia: Lessons From 
Cross-country Experience,” IMF Working Paper WP/09/37, International Monetary Fund (March 2009): 9. 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp0937.pdf. 
22 Berg and Borensztein, “The Pros and Cons of Full Dollarization,” 18. 
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allows the citizens to conduct transactions with other citizens throughout the country. 
Therefore, to do away with a national symbol like sovereign currency could serve to 
reduce national identity, loyalty to the government, and perhaps even cause elected 
officials to be removed from office due to strong opposition to dollarization.23 
B. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The first potential hypothesis to the major research question is, dollarization has 
been a beneficial policy decision for El Salvador and Ecuador. This hypothesis can be 
validated through studying the macroeconomic performance of the two countries. If a 
clear pattern can be shown that the economic situation after dollarization is better than 
before dollarization, then the hypothesis will be true. If true, then the implication could 
be that other Latin American countries should strongly consider adopting a similar 
policy. This would be especially true if other countries in Latin America looked 
economically similar to El Salvador and Ecuador prior to dollarization. In that case, an 
argument could be made for those other countries to study the policies and performance 
of El Salvador and Ecuador and try to emulate the positive outcomes.  
A second and opposite hypothesis could be: dollarization has not been a beneficial 
policy decision for El Salvador and Ecuador. Again, a look at the macroeconomic 
performance of both countries will be needed to prove, or disprove, this hypothesis. If 
this hypothesis holds true then the logical recommendation would be to discourage other 
Latin American countries from dollarizing. With no derived benefit from implementing a 
drastic decision such as dollarization, then other countries would do well to study the 
example of those that have tried it and avoid the same mistakes.  
It is possible that neither of the two hypotheses will be correct. When evaluating 
the performance of the two countries, perhaps one will prove to have performed well 
while the other has not. In this case a closer examination of why there is a difference will 
be needed. Some economists advocate that before dollarization is adopted, among other 
things, the banking system must be strengthened, the public debt must be lengthened, 
some labor market reforms need to take place, and more free trade agreements must be 
                                                 
23 Chang, “Dollarization: A Scorecard,” 3. 
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negotiated.24 In this sense, El Salvador was more prepared for the transition to the dollar 
than Ecuador.25 This prior preparation could result in better economic performance, but it 
does not necessarily have to. 
If there is a mixed result between El Salvador and Ecuador, then that would have 
an effect on policy recommendations. The recommendation is straightforward if both 
benefitted from or both were disadvantaged by dollarization. Having a mixed result, 
however, would require more specific recommendations. If a Latin American country 
more closely resembled the successful dollarized country, then the policy 
recommendation would be to dollarize. If a country looked more like the unsuccessful 
case, however, then the obvious recommendation would be to forego dollarization. 
Therefore, depending on what the research uncovers, the recommendations could be 
significantly different. 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research design for this thesis is a comparative case study. There are only 
three Latin American countries that have dollarized their currencies: Panama, El 
Salvador, and Ecuador. This thesis will specifically analyze El Salvador and Ecuador. 
Both of these countries have dollarized fairly recently. Ecuador made the switch in 2000 
and El Salvador began in 2001.26 Panama, on the other hand, dollarized in 1904.27 Given 
the large time disparity between when Panama dollarized and when El Salvador and 
Ecuador did, analyzing Panama in conjunction with the other two seems misguided. It is 
more appropriate to only compare Ecuador and El Salvador because the timing in their 
cases is more similar than in Panama’s experience.  
This thesis will rely on short term and long term economic factors in evaluating 
the results of dollarization. Specifically, it will examine inflation rates, interest rates, and 
                                                 
24 Eichengreen, “When to Dollarize,” 1–2. 
25 Robert J. Barro, “The Dollar Club: Why Countries Are So Keen to Join,” Business Week (December 
11, 2000): 34. 
26 Myriam Quispe-Agnoli and Elena Whisler, “Official Dollarization and the Banking System in 
Ecuador and El Salvador,” Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Review (Third Quarter, 2006): 55. 
27 Ibid., 56. 
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other factors before and after dollarization. In the short term, inflation rates and interest 
rates should both begin a downward trend and, over the long term, should begin to 
closely mirror the United States’ numbers. It is possible that data indicating the results of 
dollarization over the short term and long term may not be sufficiently available. If data 
is indeed lacking, then the trends over the past 15 years will have to suffice as a predictor 
for the future. 
Sources for this thesis will be derived from primary and secondary sources such 
as scholarly books, peered reviewed journals, both government and non-government 
reports and articles, and news and magazine articles from the United States, Ecuador and 
El Salvador. Additionally, data will be taken from sources such as the International 
Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, and other official data 
and statistics sources. 
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II. EL SALVADOR CASE STUDY 
A. HISTORY 
El Salvador’s history is characterized by unrest and competing factions. Almost 
immediately after the Spanish conquistadores arrived, they instituted an externally 
focused, commodity driven export market. This type of economy led to a two class 
system where rich elites owned the majority of the land and wielded much power while 
the lower class struggled to escape poverty. Post-colonial El Salvador saw little change in 
the economic model. After independence, elite rule over a poorer class continued as did 
the commodity driven export economic model. Elite rule took on a new form through 
most of the twentieth century. Instead of individual strong men coalescing to install 
civilian dictators, El Salvador began to experience military dictatorships. These regimes 
came to power with promises of widespread reforms that never materialized once they 
were in charge. Furthermore, corruption became commonplace in these regimes that 
promised to fix corruption. Lack of reforms and corruption resulted in opportunities for 
other military factions to stage coups on the basis that they would fix the problems 
rampant in the current regime. This cycle continued through much of the middle 1900s 
causing extensive turmoil in the country.28 
Amid the aforementioned unrest, El Salvador performed surprisingly well 
economically through the 1960s and 1970s. GDP per capita rose by 2% annually from 
1962 to 1978. Inflation remained at a manageable 1.5% per year from 1963 through 
1972. The agricultural industry went through changes to make it more productive and 
competitive with regard to exports. There was also substantial growth in the industrial 
sector during this time. Then the OPEC oil-price crisis hit in the 1970s.29 
When oil prices rose, the hidden problems in the Salvadoran economy began to 
manifest themselves. As in many other Latin American countries during the 1970s, 
inflation went up. Instead of the 1.5% it had been maintaining, El Salvador experienced 
                                                 
28 John A. Booth, Christine J. Wade, and Thomas W. Walker, Understanding Central America: 
Global Forces, Rebellion, and Change, 6th ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2015), 56.  
29 Ibid., 140. 
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12.8% annual inflation from 1973–1979. As a result, real wages and purchasing power 
both declined over the same time period. A rise in unemployment coincided with the rise 
in inflation. With the increased unemployment and a reduction in purchasing power, the 
lower class saw an increase in overall poverty. The upper class, however, remained 
relatively unscathed through this time period.30 
By 1979, the economic situation in El Salvador began to affect all citizens. With 
the worldwide economic slowdown, large external debt, and unwillingness from 
international lenders to give El Salvador an endless supply of cash, the Salvadoran 
economy began to contract. Overall production began to decline which led to more 
worker layoffs. GDP and GDP per capita both declined. All of this economic turmoil 
caused a rise in unrest and political activity.31 
While political opposition parties had existed since the 1960s, they never had 
much of an impact in the political arena. This lack of political power was largely a 
function of the repressive nature of the military regimes that labeled these opposition 
parties as communists and marginalized them in any way possible. Furthermore, the 
policies of the United States helped to diminish the role of these parties while aiding the 
ruling regimes since it wanted to thwart any hint of communism in the region. As the 
situation in El Salvador got markedly worse through the 1970s the political opposition 
became stronger and more organized. In response, the military regimes became more 
oppressive. Many citizens were arrested, imprisoned, and even killed for opposing the 
government. Various other human rights abuses were commonplace. By late 1979 and 
early 1980 the ruling military faction experienced extensive internal upheaval, and 
opposition and guerrilla groups united together to fight against the oppressive regime.32  
                                                 
30 Esther Wilson, “El Salvador’s Economy Sputters and U.S. Aid Policies Are the Culprit,” 




32 Charles D. Brockett, Political Movements and Violence in Central America (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 233–239. 
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El Salvador found itself in the middle of a civil war. Businessmen with major 
business interests supported the government because they benefited greatly from the 
system in place while the working class wanted change. The United States used its might 
to influence the events in El Salvador throughout the civil war. Almost immediately, the 
U.S. advocated a transition from military rule to a civilian led government. El Salvador 
complied and began a rocky transition to democratic rule. For the presidency, the U.S. 
backed a man named Jose Napoleon Duarte and his Christian Democratic Party (PDC). It 
considered him and his party centrist enough to stop alienating moderates and center-
leftist from joining the opposition movement while being able to maintain support from 
those on the right. In reality neither turned out to be true, but due to massive support from 
the U.S., Duarte and the PDC remained in power through much of the 1980s. While the 
shaky, U.S. backed government was trying to find its way, the opposition’s guerrilla 
forces were winning battles and gaining support. Had it not been for military training and 
support from the United States, the new civilian led government may have regressed into 
a military led regime that forcefully suppressed any opposition reminiscent of the recent 
past.33 
Amid all of the steps taken toward democratic rule, there was still a significant 
amount of violence against the Salvadoran citizens as a result of the civil war. The 
widespread violence spurred waves of citizens to flee the country. A little over one sixth 
of the population of El Salvador left during the civil war. A large number of those that 
fled ended up settling in the United States. Among those that stayed, 75,000 lost their 
lives between 1979 and the end of the civil war in 1992. The civil war was truly a terrible 
time for El Salvador.34 
Not only did many of its citizens flee during the civil war, but there was a lot of 
capital flight during the same time resulting in a 10% slowing of per capita production. 
This is not surprising. Multinational corporations do not like to operate in countries 
where there is a lot of risk to their investments. El Salvador was such a place during this 
                                                 
33 Tommie Sue Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador: From Civil Strife to Civil Peace (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1995), 51–54. 
34 “El Salvador: 12 Years of Civil War,” The Center for Justice and Accountability: Bringing Human 
Rights Abusers to Justice, accessed January 30, 2016, http://www.cja.org/article.php?list=type&type=199. 
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time. At the very least businesses were concerned that their employees would be 
prevented from coming to work or be killed in the daily violence. Unreliability of labor 
and the constant process of hiring and training new workers are costly for any business. 
Not only was there a concern for employees, but there was a concern for other 
investments as well. With a new fledgling democracy there was a real possibility that the 
government could collapse and revert back to an authoritarian regime. Given the past, 
there would be no guarantee that the property rights to their investments would be 
honored. Things like this are what discourage a business from continuing to operate in a 
place with massive unrest. Furthermore, this type of scenario prevents new investments 
into the country for the same reasons. Capital flight during the civil war contributed to 
overall poverty and economic depression for the Salvadoran people.35 
B. DOLLARIZATION 
At the end of the 1980s, the U.S. backed President Duarte finally started to lose 
popular approval. His biggest supporters—the labor unions—began turning on him and 
corruption within his party caused divisions. This changing tide opened the door for the 
more conservative Nationalist Republican Alliance Party (ARENA) to increase its 
influence. The ARENA party had traditionally been made up of elites from the 
agricultural, financial, and manufacturing sectors. These elites held power in the country 
and were eager for economic reforms since the last decade had seen poor economic 
performance. In 1988, ARENA made gains in the legislature and gained control of the 
presidency in 1989. Alfredo “Freddy” Cristiani won the presidential election in 1989 and 
began to implement economic reforms. For the next 20 years ARENA held the 
presidency and pursued neoliberal economic policies. Arguably the most significant 
policy implemented during ARENA’s time leading the country was its decision 
dollarize.36 
Leading up to dollarization, ARENA began its own internal transition. The 
financial and import factions within ARENA began to gain more power and influence 
                                                 
35 Booth, Wade, and Walker, Understanding Central America, 150. 
36 Ibid., 152–159. 
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than the agricultural faction. This change contributed to the decision to dollarize. Some, 
such as Towers and Borzutzky, have argued that ARENA led El Salvador to dollarize for 
political reasons, not just financial. The logic goes, ARENA leaned toward authoritarian 
tendencies and preferred ruling in a heavy-handed manner with policies that helped the 
powerful elites within its party with little regard for others. Dollarization, then, would 
help ensure stability for those businesses involved in finance or external trade because 
they would not have to worry about elected politicians tinkering with monetary policy 
such as currency devaluations. Therefore, regardless of which political party controlled 
the legislature or the presidency, a vast majority of real power and wealth would lie with 
ARENA and its supporters because they would benefit from dollarization the most. 
Additionally, the ability to reverse dollarization later would be practically impossible thus 
limiting future political parties’ power.37 
Another narrative for why El Salvador dollarized is that it was simply the next 
logical step to take. After the neoliberal reforms began in the 1990s, macroeconomic 
factors began to improve for El Salvador. Inflation began to fall to from 18.5% in 1993 to 
between 2–2.5% by 2000.38 GDP growth from 1992 through 1995 averaged 6.85% 
annually and from 1992 to 2000 it averaged 4.73%.39 In addition, the government was 
already pegging the colón to the dollar and trying to maintain an exchange rate of 8.75 
colónes for every dollar. Since the United States had been its biggest trading partner and 
would be for the foreseeable future, and given the substantial amount of remittances 
flowing into the country from those that had emigrated to the U.S., dollarization was the 
next logical step to take to help increase trade and spur more growth and investment in 
the country.  
The first explanation seems to make more sense for why El Salvador dollarized. 
El Salvador has had a history of elite rulers that have pursued policies beneficial to 
                                                 
37 Marcia Towers and Silvia Borzutzky, “The Socioeconomic Implications of Dollarization in El 
Salvador,” Latin American Politics and Society 46, no. 3 (2004): 34. 
38 “World Development Indicators: Inflation, Consumer Prices (Annual Percentage),” The World 
Bank Group, accessed October 9, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/country/el-salvador. 
39 “World Development Indicators: GDP Growth (Annual Percentage),” The World Bank Group, 
accessed October 9, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/country/el-salvador. 
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themselves and those around them with little regard for the lower class. Therefore, it is no 
stretch to think that the leadership within ARENA imposed dollarization on El Salvador 
in order to create a better business climate for themselves and their supporters. 
Furthermore, the speed at which dollarization occurred indicates that the policy was not 
debated or scrutinized by all political factions as one would expect such a momentous 
decision to be examined. The vote to dollarize happened in November of 2000 and it 
went into effect a mere 39 days later on January 1, 2001.40 
Has dollarization been a beneficial policy decision for El Salvador? Have 
macroeconomic factors improved? Has El Salvador performed better economically than 
its neighbors? This thesis not only examines El Salvador in relation to its own past, but 
also in relation to how it has performed vis-à-vis its northern triangle neighbors—
Guatemala and Honduras. A comparison between these three is appropriate because, 
among other things, all three are small in size and population; their most significant 
source of imports and destination for exports is the United States; they have a similar 
language and colonial heritage; and they have similar levels of manufacturing as a 
percentage of GDP.41 A walk through the available data seems to suggest that 
dollarization has been a beneficial policy decision for El Salvador. 
C. DATA ANALYSIS 
Arguably the most telling macroeconomic factor that should indicate the success, 
or lack thereof, of dollarization is the inflation rate. An expected outcome is a low and 
stable inflation rate post dollarization. Figure 1 shows inflation rates in El Salvador since 
the end of the civil war in 1992 through 2014. 
                                                 
40 Towers and Borzutzky, “The Socioeconomic Implications of Dollarization in El Salvador,” 36. 
41 “Interactive Rankings,” Global Edge: Your Source for Global Business Knowledge, Michigan State 
University Broad College of Business, accessed March 9, 2016, http://globaledge.msu.edu/tools-and-data/
interactive-rankings; World Trade Organization, “Trade Profiles 2015,” September 18, 2015, 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/trade_profiles15_e.htm.  
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Figure 1.  Inflation Rate 1992–2014 
 
Adapted from “IMF Data Mapper,” International Monetary Fund, accessed October 9, 
2015, http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php?db=FM. 
Interestingly, the inflation rate was trending downward from its high of 18.5% in 
1993 to a low of 0.5% in 1999 just prior to dollarization. That decline in inflation raises 
the question of the validity of the argument that dollarization needed to be implemented 
to help reduce inflation. Clearly, the rates were already falling to a low level. While this 
point is undisputable, it is unknown if the rates would have stayed low. The 
counterfactual of what the inflation rate would have been if El Salvador maintained the 
colón is hard to predict. Perhaps the inflation rate would have remained low, but maybe it 
would have climbed back up to previous levels. Anyone purporting to know the answer is 
merely speculating. The actual outcome of dollarization on the inflation rate is shown in 
Figure 1. January 1, 2001 was the first official day of dollarization in El Salvador, and the 
average inflation rate from 2001 through 2014 was 3.1%. While there was a spike up to 
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7.3% in 2008, the rest of the time period indeed shows a fairly low and manageable 
inflation rate.42 
Figure 2.  Inflation Rate, 1992–2014 
 
Adapted from “World Development Indicators: Inflation, Consumer Prices (Annual 
Percentage),” The World Bank Group, accessed October 9, 2015, 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/el-salvador; “World Development Indicators: Inflation, 
Consumer Prices (Annual Percentage),” The World Bank Group, accessed November 12, 
2015, http://data.worldbank.org/country/united-states. 
Figure 2 graphs El Salvador’s inflation rate against the inflation rate of the United 
States over the same time period. In the early to middle 1990s there was an obvious 
disparity between the inflation rates of the two countries. After dollarization the inflation 
rates take a strikingly similar path, which is expected. The average inflation for the 
United States from 2001–2014 was 2.3% compared to 3.1% for El Salvador during that 
same time. Furthermore, from 2012–2014 El Salvador had less annual inflation than the 
United States. The trend shown in Figure 2 and the absolute values from 2012–2014 
                                                 
42 “World Development Indicators: Inflation, Consumer Prices (Annual Percentage),” The World 
Bank Group, accessed October 9, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/country/el-salvador; “World 
Development Indicators: Inflation, Consumer Prices (Annual Percentage),” The World Bank Group, 
accessed November 12, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/country/united-states.  
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support the argument that dollarization has been a beneficial policy choice for El 
Salvador since inflation has maintained a low and stable level.43 
How has El Salvador performed compared to its neighbors in the northern 
triangle—Guatemala and Honduras? Figure 3 graphs the inflation rates of the northern 
triangle countries from post El Salvador’s dollarization in 2001 through 2014. It tells an 
interesting story. The northern triangle countries seem to follow the same general trends 
with regard to inflation. This could bolster the counterfactual argument that El Salvador 
would have performed similarly had it maintained its sovereign currency. Even if that 
were true, there is no way to know what the absolute value from year to year would have 
been. It could have maintained the same trend but been a higher value than Honduras and 
Guatemala, or it could have been lower. The data in Figure 3, however, shows that ever 
since dollarization El Salvador has maintained a lower inflation rate than both Honduras 
and Guatemala. Again, over this time period El Salvador averaged 3.1% inflation. 
Guatemala almost doubled that average at 6.1% and Honduras averaged 7.1% from 







                                                 
43 “World Development Indicators: Inflation, Consumer Prices (Annual Percentage),” The World 
Bank Group, accessed October 9, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/country/el-salvador; “World 
Development Indicators: Inflation, Consumer Prices (Annual Percentage),” The World Bank Group, 
accessed November 12, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/country/united-states.  
44 “World Development Indicators: Inflation, Consumer Prices (Annual Percentage),” The World 
Bank Group, accessed October 9, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/country/el-salvador; “IMF Data 
Mapper,” International Monetary Fund, accessed October 9, 2015, http://www.imf.org/external/
datamapper/index.php?db=FM. 
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Figure 3.  Inflation Rate, 2001–2014 
Adapted from “World Development Indicators: Inflation, Consumer Prices (Annual 
Percentage),” The World Bank Group, accessed October 9, 2015, 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/el-salvador; “IMF Data Mapper,” International 
Monetary Fund, accessed October 9, 2015, http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/
index.php?db=FM. 
Inflation is not the only macroeconomic factor to consider. Interest rates should 
also be a telltale sign of dollarization success. A dollarizing country should expect to 
have interest rates fall and then mirror the U.S. interest rates. Figure 4 shows the interest 
rates of El Salvador and the United States from 1992 through 2014. 
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Figure 4.  Interest Rates, 1992–2014 
 
Adapted from “World Development Indicators: Real Interest Rates (Percentage),” The 
World Bank Group, accessed October 9, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/country/el-
salvador; “World Development Indicators: Real Interest Rates (Percentage),” The World 
Bank Group, accessed November 12, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/country/united-
states. 
Contrary to the inflation rates, El Salvador’s interest rates in Figure 4 do not 
mirror the United States’ rates. After dollarization in 2001, the expected initial decline in 
interest rates can be seen, but they do not closely follow the U.S. rates past 2003. This 
could be because dollarization did not have the desired effect on interest rates. If this is 
true then the conclusion is that dollarization was not a beneficial policy choice to 
influence interest rates, and therefore not beneficial for El Salvador. Comparing El 
Salvador’s interest rates against the U.S. rates is only one side of the comparison though. 
Looking at how the Salvadoran interest rates performed against Honduras and Guatemala 
is another factor to consider. 
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Figure 5.  Interest Rates, 1992–2014 
 
Adapted from “World Development Indicators: Real Interest Rates (Percentage),” The 
World Bank Group, accessed October 9, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/country/el-
salvador; “World Development Indicators: Real Interest Rates (Percentage),” The World 
Bank Group, accessed October 9, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/country/honduras; 
“World Development Indicators: Real Interest Rates (Percentage),” The World Bank 
Group, accessed October 9, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/country/guatemala. 
Figure 5 graphs the interest rates of the northern triangle countries from 1992–
2014. This dataset shows that after 2001, El Salvador maintained a lower interest rate 
than Honduras and Guatemala. So while Figure 4 did not help the dollarization argument, 
Figure 5 shows another way that El Salvador out-performed its neighbors post 
dollarization. As a result, Figure 5 builds up the dollarization position since El Salvador 
was able to maintain a more favorable business climate with lower interest rates vis-à-vis 
its northern triangle neighbors. 
Another simple comparison that can be made is annual GDP growth. Figure 6 
shows annual GDP growth for the northern triangle. Clearly from this graph El Salvador 
has consistently grown at a slower rate than it neighbors. The average growth for the time 
period shown is 1.9% for El Salvador and approximately 3.5% for Honduras and 
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Guatemala.45 Again, dollarization is not the only consideration when accounting for GDP 
growth, but it is interesting that El Salvador has not been able to outperform either 
Honduras or Guatemala in terms of growth. 
Figure 6.  GDP Growth (Annual Percentage) 
 
Adapted from “World Development Indicators: GDP Growth (Annual Percentage),” The 
World Bank Group, accessed October 9, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/country/el-
salvador; “World Development Indicators: GDP Growth (Annual Percentage),” The 
World Bank Group, accessed December 16, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/country/
honduras; “World Development Indicators: GDP Growth (Annual Percentage),” The 
World Bank Group, accessed December 16, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/country/
guatemala. 
GDP per capita is the opposite however. Figure 7 graphs GDP per capita from 
2001–2014. From this chart it is clear that El Salvador has outperformed its neighbors 
with regard to GDP per capita every year of dollarization. Over the time period, El 
                                                 
45 “World Development Indicators: GDP Growth (Annual Percentage),” The World Bank Group, 
accessed October 9, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/country/el-salvador; “World Development Indicators: 
GDP Growth (Annual Percentage),” The World Bank Group, accessed December 16, 2015, 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/honduras; “World Development Indicators: GDP Growth (Annual 
Percentage),” The World Bank Group, accessed December 16, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/country/
guatemala.  
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Salvador has averaged per capita GDP of $3,269.46 During the same time Guatemala 
averaged $2,527 and Honduras averaged $1,792.47 So, even though El Salvador grew 
less than the other two as a percentage of GDP, their GDP per capita amount was more. 
The good news for the northern triangle, however, is that all of them have seen an 
increase in GDP per capita since 2001. 
Figure 7.  GDP Per Capita (Current U.S.$) 
 
Adapted from “World Development Indicators: GDP Per Capita (Current U.S.$),” The 
World Bank Group, accessed October 9, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/country/el-
salvador; “World Development Indicators: GDP Per Capita (Current U.S.$),” The World 
Bank Group, accessed December 16, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/country/honduras; 
“World Development Indicators: GDP Per Capita (Current U.S.$),” The World Bank 
Group, accessed December 16, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/country/guatemala. 
While GDP per capita is a good metric to try to determine how well off the people 
in a particular country are, an even more telling metric is the poverty headcount ratio. 
                                                 
46 “World Development Indicators: GDP Per Capita (Current U.S.$),” The World Bank Group, 
accessed October 9, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/country/el-salvador. 
47 “World Development Indicators: GDP Per Capita (Current U.S.$),” The World Bank Group, 
accessed December 16, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/country/honduras; “World Development 
Indicators: GDP Per Capita (Current U.S.$),” The World Bank Group, accessed December 16, 2015, 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/guatemala. 
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This statistic tries to accurately determine what percentage of the population lives in 
poverty. It gets broken down into two different levels. The first is the percentage of the 
population that lives on less than $3.10 per day and the second is the percentage that lives 
on less than $1.90 per day. Figures 8 and 9 graph these percentages for the northern 
triangle countries. Guatemala only reported data for the early 2000s so their depiction is 
rather truncated.  
As evidenced in the charts, El Salvador has a lower percentage of its population in 
poverty than the other two countries. For 2013, the last year reported, El Salvador had 
11.53% of its population below $3.10 per day while Honduras had 34.55% below 
$3.10.48 That means that Honduras had three times as many people, as a percentage of 
the population, in poverty than El Salvador. In real numbers, El Salvador had just over 
703,000 people below $3.10 compared to Honduras’ 2.7 million people under the same 
poverty mark—almost four times as many as El Salvador.49 
                                                 
48 “World Development Indicators: Poverty Headcount Ratio at $3.10 a Day (Percentage of 
Population),” The World Bank Group, accessed October 9, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/country/el-
salvador; “World Development Indicators: Poverty Headcount Ratio at $3.10 a Day (Percentage of 




Figure 8.  Poverty Headcount Ratio at $3.10 a Day (Percentage of 
Population) 
 
Adapted from “World Development Indicators: Poverty Headcount Ratio at $3.10 a Day 
(Percentage of Population),” The World Bank Group, accessed October 9, 2015, 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/el-salvador; “World Development Indicators: Poverty 
Headcount Ratio at $3.10 a Day (Percentage of Population ),” The World Bank Group, 
accessed December 16, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/country/honduras; “World 
Development Indicators: Poverty Headcount Ratio at $3.10 a Day (Percentage of 
Population ),” The World Bank Group, accessed December 16, 2015, 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/guatemala. 
The numbers for the $1.90 per day level are better for both countries, but the 
comparison between the two is still stark. In 2013, El Salvador had only 3.25% of its 
population under the $1.90 mark. Honduras, on the other hand, reported 18.93%.50 In real 
numbers that equates to almost 1.5 million people in Honduras under $1.90 compared to 
just under 200,000 in El Salvador. This means that Honduras had more than double the 
                                                 
50 “World Development Indicators: Poverty Headcount Ratio at $1.90 a Day (Percentage of 
Population),” The World Bank Group, accessed October 9, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/country/el-
salvador; “World Development Indicators: Poverty Headcount Ratio at $1.90 a Day (Percentage of 
Population),” The World Bank Group, accessed December 16, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/country/
honduras. 
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amount of people under the $1.90 poverty line than El Salvador had under the $3.10 
line.51  
Figure 9.  Poverty Headcount Ratio at $1.90 a Day (Percentage of 
Population) 
 
Adapted from “World Development Indicators: Poverty Headcount Ratio at $1.90 a Day 
(Percentage of Population),” The World Bank Group, accessed October 9, 2015, 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/el-salvador; “World Development Indicators: Poverty 
Headcount Ratio at $1.90 a Day (Percentage of Population ),” The World Bank Group, 
accessed December 16, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/country/honduras; “World 
Development Indicators: Poverty Headcount Ratio at $1.90 a Day (Percentage of 
Population ),” The World Bank Group, accessed December 16, 2015, 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/guatemala. 
At no time since dollarization, according to the charted World Bank data, has El 
Salvador been worse off than its neighbors. Furthermore, the overall trend since 
dollarization has been a reduction in poverty in El Salvador, while in Honduras there was 
a reduction with a subsequent increase since 2009. Has dollarization been the sole cause 
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Population),” The World Bank Group, accessed October 9, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/country/el-
salvador; “World Development Indicators: Poverty Headcount Ratio at $1.90 a Day (Percentage of 
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for a decrease in Salvadorans poverty? It is unlikely that dollarization is the only cause. 
More likely it is due to a full range of policies, including dollarization, that have been 
pursued that have helped reduce the number of Salvadorans living in poverty. 
The final chart in this section graphs the Gini index as estimated by the World 
Bank. This estimate attempts to capture the level of economic inequality within a given 
country. A lower number equates to more equality while a higher number indicates more 
inequality. Similar to the poverty charts, data for Guatemala was only available for the 
early 2000s. Figure 10 shows results similar to the poverty charts in that El Salvador has 
been more economically equal every year since dollarization and it has never been less 
equal than the other two countries over the same time period. The 2013 numbers were 
43.51 for El Salvador while Honduras had 53.67.52 An honest analysis cannot contribute 
El Salvador’s success vis-à-vis its neighbors completely to dollarization. It could be said, 
however, that dollarization has helped to create a more equitable economic situation in El 
Salvador. 
                                                 
52 “World Development Indicators: Gini Index (World Bank Estimate),” The World Bank Group, 
accessed October 9, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/country/el-salvador; “World Development Indicators: 
Gini Index (World Bank Estimate),” The World Bank Group, accessed December 16, 2015, 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/honduras. 
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Figure 10.  Gini Index (World Bank Estimate), Northern Triangle Countries 
 
Adapted from “World Development Indicators: Gini Index (World Bank Estimate),” The 
World Bank Group, accessed October 9, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/country/el-
salvador; “World Development Indicators: Gini Index (World Bank Estimate),” The 
World Bank Group, accessed December 16, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/country/
honduras; “World Development Indicators: Gini Index (World Bank Estimate),” The 
World Bank Group, accessed December 16, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/country/
guatemala. 
D. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Given the discussion of the data, what can be determined about El Salvador’s 
decision to dollarize? Based on the previous evidence, a proper interpretation is that 
dollarization has been an overall beneficial policy change for El Salvador. The only 
metric analyzed where El Salvador performed worse than its neighbors was in percentage 
growth of GDP. El Salvador still experienced GDP growth, just not as much as its 
neighbors. Inflation and interest rates—the two most telling indicators—both showed a 
reduction and stabilization after dollarization. Furthermore, El Salvador has shown a 
consistent downward trend in levels of poverty and inequality. 
Further research should be done to determine the extent of poverty reduction that 
can be attributed to dollarization. Any issue such as poverty will not have one cause or 
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one solution, therefore, it is necessary to determine what factors are contributing to its 
reduction in El Salvador so that the downward trend can continue. In sum, from a 
macroeconomic view, dollarization has been a beneficial policy choice for El Salvador. 
Since this is the case, should Guatemala and Honduras follow the same path? Based on 
the data above, the answer is probably “no.” While their inflation rates and interest rates 
are above those of El Salvador’s, they are not so dramatically above, nor unstable, to 
suggest the need to dollarize. If inflation and interest rates began to climb excessively 
coupled with other negative macroeconomic factors then a serious discussion on 
dollarization would be wise. Right now that does not seem to be necessary. 
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III. ECUADOR CASE STUDY 
A. HISTORY 
Ecuador’s history shares some similarities to the Salvadoran experience, but at the 
same time it has its own unique story. Like El Salvador, Ecuador was colonized by the 
Spanish which largely resulted in a two class system—the rich European elite and the 
poor indigenous people.53 Additionally, Ecuador’s economy has traditionally centered on 
an externally focused commodity market.54 Furthermore, throughout its history Ecuador 
has had periods of military rule just like El Salvador.55 A distinct difference though, is 
that while El Salvador experienced substantial violence under the military regime during 
their civil war Ecuador did not. In fact, Ecuador did not even go through a civil war on its 
journey to democracy. The lack of violence in Ecuador’s case certainly sets it apart from 
many other countries in Latin America that saw military regimes implement repressive 
forms of rule and atrocities against its own citizens. 
Even though Ecuador had the good fortune of a relatively peaceful political past, 
economic or political stability did not automatically follow. Economic instability was 
mainly a function of overreliance on certain commodity exports combined with a lack of 
investment into other areas of its economy. Given the cyclical nature of commodities, 
there were periods of great revenue, but once the commodity du jour began its inevitable 
price decline political unrest would begin to grow. Swings in the economic prosperity of 
Ecuador had a corresponding effect on the political sphere. It is not a stretch to 
characterize the relationship between the economic and political stability, or instability, 
as an inverse relationship. With an increase in economic exports and economic growth, 
there was a corresponding decrease in political unrest and infighting. The opposite was 
true as well; as the commodity booms began slowing and economic growth decreased, 
the amount of political instability increased. This common theme of a commodity driven 
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54 Ibid., 13. 
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economy, reliant on world prices, that in turn plays a role in the political domain can be 
traced from the 1600s to the current day. 
The first incidence of the commodity boom-bust cycle for Ecuador occurred in the 
1600s. Its first foray into this economic model began with textiles. Colonial Ecuador 
went from six textile mills in 1595 to over 200 by the end of the 1600s. As can happen 
with virtually any commodity, worldwide competition increased, demand decreased, and 
prices decreased. This caused a reduction in textile mills in Colonial Ecuador. By 1720 
only 60 mills were left from the once booming industry.56  
The next big boom for Ecuador—the cacao boom—occurred well after its 1820 
independence from Spain. Cacao was exported from Ecuador since its colonial days. A 
rapid rise in demand for cacao from the late 1800s into the early1900s coupled with the 
ease of production in coastal areas of Ecuador helped propel the country to its status as 
the world’s foremost cacao producer. Ecuador did not worry much about competition or 
substitutes since its costs of production were low and most of the plantations were located 
in the coastal plains near the ports in Guayaquil, which kept transportation costs low. As 
a result, Ecuador began to rely heavily on its cacao exports. Schodt explains that “from 
1885 to 1922, cacao represented between 65 and 70% of the value of all exports.”57 Not 
only was there an overreliance on one commodity, but the windfall profits from the boom 
were not invested into national infrastructure, with the exception of some upgrades to the 
ports in Guayaquil. Most of the profits were used for politically expedient social 
spending. While this garnered good will with the Ecuadorian people, it was unsustainable 
once the cacao boom was over. The politicians still tried to maintain spending levels 
which only increased public debt and inflation. Ultimately, the bad economy and political 
unrest led to a military coup. Military control lasted less than a year, but the political 
unrest would continue until the next commodity boom cycle.58 
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Ecuador’s third boom cycle started around the end of World War II. Just as with 
cacao, a worldwide spike in demand—this time for bananas—launched Ecuador into the 
banana export business. Its geographic features helped to make it an ideal place to grow 
bananas. Some of these features were there was a substantial amount of land with great 
soil quality ready to be converted to banana plantations, the climate was ideal, plant 
disease in the area was minimal, and the area was largely protected from tropical storms 
experienced in other areas of Latin America. As a result of these comparative advantages, 
Ecuador quickly became the world’s largest supplier of bananas. In the early 1960s, 
banana exports accounted for over 60% of all export revenue for Ecuador and almost 
30% of total world value.59  
Along with this increase in government revenue came an increase in government 
spending. This time, though, Ecuador spent more money on infrastructure than it had 
during the cacao boom. It invested in building an extensive road system throughout the 
country to speed banana transportation. Overall, the prosperity from the boom brought 
about political stability in stark contrast to the preceding years. From 1925 to 1948—
roughly the time between the cacao boom and the banana boom—27 successive 
governments tried to govern Ecuador. Presidents spent an average of a mere ten months 
in office. Political instability and turnover was the norm. With the banana boom, 
however, a string of three presidents all served their four-year terms. Unfortunately, as 
the boom cycle came to a close, economic growth once again decreased and political 
unrest increased.60 
The political unrest culminated in a military coup in July 1963.61 The military 
junta, eager to stabilize the economy and the country, implemented many changes based 
on President Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress model. This model was a financial aid 
program aimed at bolstering democracy throughout Latin America through various 
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economic and social reforms.62 Some of the economic initiatives included land reforms, 
tax reforms, and fiscal and monetary policy adjustments.63 Although potentially able to 
help the economy in the long term, the policies did not sit well with the economic elites. 
Eventually, the elites’ dislike of the junta’s policies compelled them to take measures to 
undermine the junta’s legitimacy. The efforts of the elites combined with the still weak 
economy proved too much for the junta and they stepped aside in March of 1966.64 
Civilian government was back in control just in time for the next boom cycle. 
This time the boom stemmed from petroleum. Significant oil reserves were found in 1967 
in the jungle regions of Ecuador. By 1973, Ecuador was exporting 195,000 barrels of oil 
per day. While the oil discovery was a blessing for the floundering Ecuadorian economy, 
it would also prove to be a long term curse due to the reliance on world oil prices and the 
need to continually maintain, or increase, export levels.65 
While oil production was still coming online, the economy was weak. As at other 
times, the weak economy caused political unrest. The unrest culminated in another 
military coup in 1972. A military junta was established and controlled the country until 
1979. During the junta’s time in power, they tried to implement various economic and 
social reforms. An over-reliance on oil revenues, however, plagued any chance of 
successful long term reforms. Almost from the beginning of the oil boom, Ecuador set its 
sights on nationalizing the oil industry. Through various laws it was successful. 
Therefore, any petroleum earnings were dedicated to the public sector. A pattern began 
where the government would use the oil revenues during boom years to increase the size 
and spending of the government, and in down years it borrowed money to make up any 
budgetary shortfall. Not all government spending was bad. Some was spent on improving 
roads and other infrastructure throughout Ecuador, though most was spent on programs to 
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satisfy various political demands. The problem was when oil prices declined and the 
government would not cut spending or raise taxes to meet budgetary requirements.66 
As Ecuador transitioned back to a civilian led government in 1979, the economic 
condition of the country was not good to say the least. Debt was high; between 1976 and 
1979 debt increased four and a half times. By 1980, struggling oil production and an 
increase in domestic demand for oil reduced the total oil exports to just over half of what 
it had been in 1973. To make matters worse oil prices began to decline. Furthermore, 
natural disasters played a role in straining economic output throughout the 1980s. All of 
these things together caught Ecuador in an almost perpetual cycle of austerity measures, 
inflation, devaluations, and political unrest.67 
Each administration through the 1980s experienced hard financial times. The 
Hurtado administration (1981–1984) faced problems created by drought and flooding that 
translated into balance of payment losses. Inflation rose to 52.5% in 1983. Hurtado 
undertook various austerity measures including eliminating government subsidies for 
food. He also devalued the sucre twice. These actions hurt the poorer citizens as they saw 
real purchasing power decrease. His policies did keep Ecuador in good standing with the 
international financial community, however, which proved to be important for debt 
restructuring negotiations.68 
The next administration—Febres Cordero (1984–1988)—experienced similar 
economic woes. From 1985 until the end of 1986, Ecuador only paid the interest on its 
external debt. Additionally, Ecuador’s overall economic performance was heavily 
dependent on world oil prices. That dependency translated in a boom year in 1985, but 
then a bust year immediately followed in 1986. The next catastrophic blow to the 
economy was an earthquake in March 1987 that destroyed 40 kilometers of oil pipeline. 
The pipeline was unserviceable for almost 6 months, which contributed to a negative 
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5.2% GDP growth that year. By the end of his presidency, the best Febres Cordero hoped 
to do was re-negotiate foreign debt and encourage foreign investment. In the end, the 
administration relaxed some of the economic policies and saw government spending 
increase once again. Over his time in office the sucre devalued from a 54 sucres to 1 
dollar exchange rate to 550 sucres to 1 dollar.69 
The subsequent president—Rodrigo Borja (1988–1992)—came in with a plan to 
help the economy, but he too wavered between strict policies and increased spending. At 
the core, his plans attempted to grow GDP, reduce the government’s deficit, and devalue 
the sucre to reduce imports. By 1989 the sucre reached an exchange rate of 648 sucres to 
1 dollar. Like his predecessors, his reforms were highly sensitive to external oil prices 
due to the reliance on oil exports. Borja’s last year in office inflation rose almost 55%.70 
B. DOLLARIZATION 
All through the 1990s, financial instability was the norm. A significant portion of 
this instability was rooted in the overreliance of oil exports as a source of revenue. In 
addition, inflation was a problem all through the 1990s. The Borja and Ballen 
administrations tried to implement various economic reforms to help the economy. By 
the second half to the 1990s, however, adjustment fatigue among the Ecuadorians was 
setting in. Other contributors to later instability were the Central Bank adopting a 
modified flexible exchange rate regime in 1992 and a 1994 law to deregulate and 
liberalize the financial system. The 1994 law allowed banks to reduce reserve 
requirement to 10% for domestic and foreign currency, and the law made the Central 
Bank the lender of last resort for large institutions and small depositors. With the Central 
Bank as the lender of last resort, banks undertook bad banking practices that they 
probably would not have otherwise. Additionally, the liberalization brought about a credit 
boom which only further indebted Ecuador’s government.71 
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The first of a string of problems came in 1995. Ecuador and Peru engaged in a 
small border war. Although it did not last long, there was enough unrest to spark capital 
flight in Ecuador. During this time the Central Bank chose to hold the exchange rate 
stable, which in turn caused a shortage of cash. Liquidity became a problem and one 
private bank had to be absorbed by the Central Bank. The failure of this private bank was 
a foreshadowing of what was to come.72 
Dollarization fully came about as a result of a financial crisis in 1998. Beginning 
in 1997 and continuing through 1998, various external shocks, such as flooding from El 
Nino and the Russian and Brazilian financial crises, brought about financial stress in 
Ecuador. In addition, oil prices also declined. All of this together caused the beginning of 
the banking crisis. The first bank to close was a small bank, but the effect it had was 
large. Panic started to creep in and runs on the banks began. This caused banks to run low 
on cash and ultimately either close permanently or secure money from the Central Bank 
to stay afloat. This in turn caused more worry and more runs on the banks. Finally, in 
March 1999, the government imposed a freeze on bank deposits. This only served to 
further worry the citizens and encourage them to move out of the sucre as soon as 
possible. Once the freeze was lifted slightly, the runs on the banks continued. Then in 
September 1999, Ecuador defaulted on its external debt. All the while inflation soared 
and people were scrambling for dollars to protect themselves against inflation.73 
As a seemingly last ditch effort to help the floundering economy, in January 2000, 
President Mahuad announced that Ecuador would officially dollarize its economy. Only a 
week later he was removed from office, but Ecuador continued with the dollarization 
plan.74 Ecuador achieved full dollarization of its economy by September 2000.75 What 
has transpired since the decision to dollarize? Has dollarization helped the Ecuadorian 
economy? How have they faired compared with their neighbors? As in the El Salvador 
                                                 
72 Jacome, “The Late 1990s Financial Crisis in Ecuador,” 16. 
73 Ibid., 16–24. 
74 Roberto Chang, “Dollarization: A Scorecard,” 1. 
75 Quispe-Agnoli and Whisler, “Official Dollarization and the Banking System in Ecuador and El 
Salvador,” 59. 
 38 
case study, a comparison between Ecuador and its neighbors is appropriate because they 
are all considered Andean states; they all share a similar language and colonial heritage; 
they all have low population densities; and they all have similar levels of manufacturing 
as a percentage of GDP.76 A look at the data provides more insight and suggests that 
dollarization has been a beneficial decision for Ecuador. 
C. DATA ANALYSIS 
Similar to the analysis on El Salvador, this analysis begins with a look at the 
inflation rate in Ecuador. As previously stated, the inflation rate through the 1990s—and 
through the 1980s too—was high. Figure 11 shows how inflation started at just over 48% 
in 1990 and increased slightly until a peak at almost 55% in 1992. Inflation then began a 
downward trend as the previously discussed financial liberalization laws came into effect. 
This trend continued until 1995, which was the beginning of what would become the full 
blown financial crisis of 1999. Inflation peaked in 2000 at 96% and then a massive 
downward trend coincided with the decision to dollarize the Ecuadorian economy. It is 
clear that inflation dropped off dramatically and has stayed relatively low since 2000. In 
fact, the average inflation rate from 2000–2014 was 13.2%. Furthermore, the average rate 
since 2002 has been 5%.77 
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Figure 11.  Inflation Rate, 1990–2014 
 
Adapted from “IMF Data Mapper,” International Monetary Fund, accessed January 14, 
2016, http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php?db=FM.  
Figure 12 shows the inflation rates from 1990–2014 for Ecuador and the United 
States. Due to the scale needed for Ecuador, the United States’ inflation rate almost 
appears to be a straight line. Because of this, Figure 13 graphs the same values but only 
shows the years from 2002–2014. 
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Figure 12.  Inflation Rate, 1990–2014 
 
Adapted from “IMF Data Mapper,” International Monetary Fund, accessed January 14, 
2016, http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php?db=FM.  
Figure 13.  Inflation Rate, 2002–2014 
 
Adapted from “IMF Data Mapper,” International Monetary Fund, accessed January 14, 
2016, http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php?db=FM.  
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Figure 13 provides a better visual comparison between the inflation rates of 
Ecuador and the United States. Ideally, Ecuador’s inflation rate should fall close to and 
mirror the U.S. rates. The chart shows that Ecuador’s inflation falls and begins to trend 
with the U.S. rates. The average rate in the U.S. during the time period in Figure 13 was 
2.3%. As previously stated, the average over the same time for Ecuador was 5%. This 
particular data set bolsters the position that Ecuador’s decision to dollarize was prudent. 
There was a drastic reduction in inflation and Ecuador’s rates have, for the most part, 
followed the U.S. rates, albeit at slightly higher rates.78 
Figure 14.  Inflation Rate, 1992–2014 
 
Adapted from “IMF Data Mapper,” International Monetary Fund, accessed January 14, 
2016, http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php?db=FM.  
Figure 14 graphs the inflation rates of Ecuador, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia from 
1992–2014. Although Peru and Colombia both had high inflation through the 1990s, 
prior to 2001 Ecuador clearly had the highest rates. All four countries began a decline in 
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inflation rates at various times, and after 2002 they all enjoyed similar trends. Figure 15 
shows the four countries’ inflation rates from 2002–2014.  
Figure 15.  Inflation Rate, 2002–2014 
 
Adapted from “IMF Data Mapper,” International Monetary Fund, accessed January 14, 
2016, http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php?db=FM.  
Figure 15 shows that Bolivia had the most volatile inflation rate, but the average 
over that time was only 5.4%. Ecuador’s average was 5% compared to Colombia at 4.6%, 
and Peru at 2.7%.79 While this comparison shows that Ecuador did not outperform its 
neighbors with regard to inflation rates, it does show that they maintained a similar 
inflation rate. The decision to dollarize is not undermined by Figure 15’s data. On the 
contrary, when Figures 14 and 15 are viewed together it shows that Ecuador was clearly 
going the wrong direction at a very fast rate, but once dollarization happened it began 
moving in the right direction again. 
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Figure 16.  Interest Rates, 1990–2014 
 
Adapted from “World Development Indicators: Real Interest Rates (Percentage),” The 
World Bank Group, accessed January 14, 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/country/
ecuador; “World Development Indicators: Real Interest Rates (Percentage),” The World 
Bank Group, accessed January 14, 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/country/united-states. 
“Tasas de Interes Referenciales Para Prestamos Externos del Sector Privado,” Banco 
Central del Ecuador, accessed January 20, 2016, http://www.bce.fin.ec/index.php/
component/k2/item/268-tasas-de-interes-referenciales-para-prestamos-externos-del-
sector-privado. 
Figure 16 graphs the interest rates in Ecuador and the United States from 1990–
2014. Through the 1990s, Ecuador’s interest rates were high and fluctuated rather wildly. 
In fact, the average interest rate between 1990 and 2000 was 42%.80 The average 
percentage change year to year over that same time was 15.5%.81 In contrast, the U.S.’s 
average interest rate from 1990–2000 was 5.75%.82 Again, due to the scale needed for 
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Figure 16, it is difficult to see what happened after dollarization. Figure 17 shows both 
countries’ interest rates from 2001–2014. 
Figure 17.  Interest Rates, 2001–2014 
 
Adapted from “World Development Indicators: Real Interest Rates (Percentage),” The 
World Bank Group, accessed January 14, 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/country/
ecuador; “World Development Indicators: Real Interest Rates (Percentage),” The World 
Bank Group, accessed January 14, 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/country/united-states. 
“Tasas de Interes Referenciales Para Prestamos Externos del Sector Privado,” Banco 
Central del Ecuador, accessed January 20, 2016, http://www.bce.fin.ec/index.php/
component/k2/item/268-tasas-de-interes-referenciales-para-prestamos-externos-del-
sector-privado. 
Interestingly, Figure 17 shows that Ecuador has still had some volatility in its 
interest rates post-dollarization. The average rate, however, for Ecuador from 2001–2014 
was 1.2%, while the U.S. average over the same time was 2.7%.83 Ecuador’s post-
dollarization average sharply contrasts with its rates prior to dollarization. Furthermore, 
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after dollarization a significant correction in interest rates is evident. The data evidence 
shows the expected effect of aligning Ecuadorian interest rates with U.S. rates. This 
furthers the idea that the dollarization policy benefitted Ecuador’s macroeconomic 
situation. 
Figure 18.  Interest Rates, 1990–2014 
 
Adapted from “World Development Indicators: Real Interest Rates (Percentage),” The 
World Bank Group, accessed January 14, 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/country/
ecuador; “World Development Indicators: Real Interest Rates (Percentage),” The World 
Bank Group, accessed January 14, 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/country/colombia; 
“World Development Indicators: Real Interest Rates (Percentage),” The World Bank 
Group, accessed January 14, 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/country/peru; “World 
Development Indicators: Real Interest Rates (Percentage),” The World Bank Group, 
accessed January 14, 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/country/bolivia; “Tasas de Interes 
Referenciales Para Prestamos Externos del Sector Privado,” Banco Central del Ecuador, 
accessed January 20, 2016, http://www.bce.fin.ec/index.php/component/k2/item/268-
tasas-de-interes-referenciales-para-prestamos-externos-del-sector-privado. 
Figure 18 graphs a comparison in interest rates between Ecuador and its three 
closest neighbors. Prior to 2001, three of the four countries had high and fluctuating 
interest rates. Nevertheless, Ecuador had the highest average rates of the four countries. 
As mentioned, from 1990–2000, Ecuador’s interest rate average was 42%; Peru, Bolivia, 
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and Colombia’s respective averages were 28.5, 33, and 12%.84 Since the post-
dollarization interest rate trends are difficult to see in Figure 18, Figure 19 graphs the 
interest rates from 2001–2014. 
Figure 19.  Interest Rates, 2001–2014 
 
Adapted from “World Development Indicators: Real Interest Rates (Percentage),” The 
World Bank Group, accessed January 14, 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/country/
ecuador; “World Development Indicators: Real Interest Rates (Percentage),” The World 
Bank Group, accessed January 14, 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/country/colombia; 
“World Development Indicators: Real Interest Rates (Percentage),” The World Bank 
Group, accessed January 14, 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/country/peru; “World 
Development Indicators: Real Interest Rates (Percentage),” The World Bank Group, 
accessed January 14, 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/country/bolivia; “Tasas de Interes 
Referenciales Para Prestamos Externos del Sector Privado,” Banco Central del Ecuador, 
accessed January 20, 2016, http://www.bce.fin.ec/index.php/component/k2/item/268-
tasas-de-interes-referenciales-para-prestamos-externos-del-sector-privado. 
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In contrast to the years prior to dollarization, Ecuador’s interest rates were much 
lower than the other three countries. The only country that had lower interest rates than 
Ecuador from 2001–2014 was Bolivia in 2006 and 2011, though Bolivia’s average over 
this time was 7%.85 Ecuador averaged 1.2% for this time frame, and Colombia and Peru 
averaged 8.4 and 17.7% respectively.86 Recall that prior to dollarization the average year-
to-year change in Ecuadorian interest rates was 15.5%. After dollarization, the average 
year-to-year change in interest rates fell to just over 4%.87 The rapid difference in interest 
rates in Ecuador from the 1990s to after 2000 can be attributed to dollarization. 
Therefore, more evidence shows that Ecuador made a sound decision to dollarize. 
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Figure 20.  GDP Growth (Annual Percentage) 
 
Adapted from “IMF Data Mapper,” International Monetary Fund, accessed January 19, 
2016, http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php?db=FM.  
Figure 20 graphs annual GDP growth of Ecuador and three of its Andean region 
neighbors. In 2000, Ecuador logged 1.1% GDP growth. That was by far the lowest out of 
the four countries. After dollarization effects started kicking in, though, GDP growth 
started to increase. Admittedly, Ecuador has had bigger year-to-year swings than the 
other countries; however, 20% of the time covered in the graph, Ecuador had the highest 
annual GDP growth out of the four. Furthermore, Ecuador has managed to keep pace 
with its neighbors’ growth since it has dollarized. Three out of the four countries have 
averaged almost identical growth numbers from 2000–2014: Ecuador, Colombia, and 
Bolivia averaged 4.3, 4.3, and 4.25% respectively.88 Peru’s average was slightly higher at 
5.3%.89 Therefore, while dollarization may not have given Ecuador significantly better 
GDP growth than its neighbors, dollarization certainly has not caused it to lag behind 
them either. It has performed just as well since it switched to the dollar. 
                                                 




Figure 21.  GDP Per Capita (Current U.S.$) 
 
Adapted from “World Development Indicators: GDP Per Capita (Current U.S.$),” The 
World Bank, accessed January 14, 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/country/ecuador; 
“World Development Indicators: GDP Per Capita (Current U.S.$),” The World Bank 
Group, accessed January 14, 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/country/colombia; “World 
Development Indicators: GDP Per Capita (Current U.S.$),” The World Bank Group, 
accessed January 14, 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/country/peru; “World Development 
Indicators: GDP Per Capita (Current U.S.$),” The World Bank Group, accessed January 
14, 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/country/bolivia. 
Figure 21 examines the GDP per capita for the same four countries as Figure 20. 
A positive sign for the Andean region is that since 2000 GDP per capita has been 
trending upward. Similar to the GDP growth discussion, Ecuador’s GDP per capita has 
not out performed Colombia or Peru, but it has not done any worse either. The Colombia, 
Peru, and Ecuador lines in Figure 21 all appear to have a similar slope. This figure is not 
so much a proof that dollarization will increase GDP per capita for any country that 
dollarizes, but it does show that dollarization has helped contribute to an increase in GDP 
per capita for Ecuador. 
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Figure 22.  Poverty Headcount Ratio at $3.10 a Day (Percentage of 
Population) 
 
Adapted from “World Development Indicators: Poverty Headcount Ratio at $3.10 a Day 
(Percentage of Population),” The World Bank, accessed January 14, 2016, 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/ecuador; “World Development Indicators: Poverty 
Headcount Ratio at $3.10 a Day (Percentage of Population),” The World Bank Group, 
accessed January 14, 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/country/colombia; “World 
Development Indicators: Poverty Headcount Ratio at $3.10 a Day (Percentage of 
Population),” The World Bank Group, accessed January 14, 2016, 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/peru; “World Development Indicators: Poverty 
Headcount Ratio at $3.10 a Day (Percentage of Population),” The World Bank Group, 
accessed January 14, 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/country/bolivia. 
GDP numbers are fine to look at as macroeconomic factors, but do those numbers 
actually show that the population as a whole is doing better, or is it just a group of 
wealthy people getting even wealthier? One way to check this is through poverty ratios. 
Figure 22 shows the poverty headcount ratio at $3.10 per day for Ecuador, Colombia, 
Peru, and Bolivia. A great sign for all four countries is that poverty levels are decreasing. 
The figure shows that Peru is leading the way percentage wise, but since it has a larger 
population than Ecuador and Bolivia the actual amount of people still in poverty is close 
to three million compared to only 1.8 million in Ecuador and just under 1.4 million in 
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Bolivia.90 Since 2000, Ecuador has gotten 4.2 million above this poverty threshold. 
While dollarization cannot be credited as the sole cause of that number, it has been an 
integral part of Ecuador’s improved economy. 
Figure 23.  Poverty Headcount Ratio at $1.90 a Day (Percentage of 
Population) 
 
Adapted from “World Development Indicators: Poverty Headcount Ratio at $1.90 a Day 
(Percentage of Population),” The World Bank, accessed January 14, 2016, 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/ecuador; “World Development Indicators: Poverty 
Headcount Ratio at $1.90 a Day (Percentage of Population),” The World Bank Group, 
accessed January 14, 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/country/colombia; “World 
Development Indicators: Poverty Headcount Ratio at $1.90 a Day (Percentage of 
Population),” The World Bank Group, accessed January 14, 2016, 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/peru; “World Development Indicators: Poverty 
Headcount Ratio at $1.90 a Day (Percentage of Population),” The World Bank Group, 
accessed January 14, 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/country/bolivia. 
                                                 
90 “World Development Indicators: Poverty Headcount Ratio at $3.10 a Day (Percentage of 
Population),” The World Bank, accessed January 14, 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/country/ecuador; 
“World Development Indicators: Poverty Headcount Ratio at $3.10 a Day (Percentage of Population),” The 
World Bank Group, accessed January 14, 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/country/peru; “World 
Development Indicators: Poverty Headcount Ratio at $3.10 a Day (Percentage of Population),” The World 
Bank Group, accessed January 14, 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/country/bolivia. 
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Similar to Figure 22, Figure 23 shows a poverty headcount ratio as a percentage 
of the population. This chart uses $1.90 as the cutoff instead of $3.10. Figure 23 is just as 
encouraging as Figure 22 because the amount of people living on less than $1.90 a day in 
all four countries is declining. Again, Peru is leading percentage wise, but not in overall 
numbers. The country with the least amount of people living on less than $1.90 a day is 
Ecuador. This fact gives evidence that dollarization has contributed to a reduction of 
poverty in Ecuador—yet another data point showing that dollarization has been a good 
decision. 
Figure 24.  Gini Index (World Bank Estimate), Andean Countries 
 
Adapted from “World Development Indicators: Gini Index (World Bank Estimate),” The 
World Bank, accessed January 14, 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/country/ecuador; 
“World Development Indicators: Gini Index (World Bank Estimate),” The World Bank 
Group, accessed January 14, 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/country/colombia; “World 
Development Indicators: Gini Index (World Bank Estimate),” The World Bank Group, 
accessed January 14, 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/country/peru; “World Development 
Indicators: Gini Index (World Bank Estimate),” The World Bank Group, accessed 
January 14, 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/country/bolivia.. 
Figure 24 graphically depicts the World Bank estimate of the Gini index for the 
same four countries. A lower number indicates more equality within the population of 
that particular country. This data was only available through 2013, but it still shows a 
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positive trend. Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia have all gotten slightly more equitable than 
Colombia over the time period shown; notwithstanding, all have shown a move toward a 
more economically equal society. Once again, this graphic shows that Ecuador has done 
no worse than any of its close neighbors in the Andean region. This fact is certainly 
significant given Ecuador’s statistics at the turn of the millennium. This is still another 
positive sign that dollarization has helped to keep Ecuador going in the right 
macroeconomic direction. 
D. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
After a look at the data points above, what can be said about dollarization in 
Ecuador? First and foremost, it is clear that dollarization has had a positive impact on 
Ecuador’s macro economy. From around 1980 to 2000, Ecuador was on a sea saw 
economically speaking. A lot of the ups and downs had to do with its reliance on oil, and 
world oil prices, as a large part of its economy. This reliance resulted in somewhat 
unpredictable government revenues, which at times caused excess borrowing. Not all 
borrowing was a result of income shortfalls; plenty of government spending and 
expansion was pursued for politically expedient purposes rather than taking a more 
prudent economic approach. Since 2000, however, Ecuador has seen a huge change for 
the better in inflation and interest rates. The other data points analyzed above also point 
out that instead of continuing on a path to complete economic collapse, as it was doing, 
Ecuador has instead competed quite well with its Andean neighbors despite its small size. 
Further research could be done to figure out what has caused Ecuador to have 
larger GDP growth swings as compared to its neighbors. Perhaps this could be attributed 
to oil, but perhaps there are more issues underlying the trend. Being able to consistently 
achieve GDP growth year after year is something that Ecuador still needs to learn how to 
do. Another area that could use more research is in determining how to effectively 
diversify Ecuadorian exports. Oil is obviously the strongest export that Ecuador has, but 
finding ways to reinvest better in that market and also expand other markets will be 
important for long term success. By expanding other markets, oil will be a smaller 
percentage of the total exports which will help mute the effects of oil price swings on 
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Ecuador’s economy. In sum, even though dollarization was taken essentially as a last 
ditch effort to save the country from economic collapse, and even though many were 
skeptical that Ecuador’s economy would even be able to handle the switch, the available 
data from the last 15 years shows that dollarization has a beneficial policy decision for 
the long term macroeconomic stability of the country.  
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IV. CONCLUSION 
A. FUTURE RESEARCH 
The focus of this thesis has been on macroeconomic effects of dollarization. As 
such, it has not discussed other topics that may be useful to understand for a country 
considering dollarization. One of these topics is, what is the impact of dollarization on 
particular socioeconomic classes in a country? This thesis has used broad, national level 
data sets to analyze dollarization effectiveness, but it does not look at individual 
socioeconomic classes, such as the middle class. The effect of dollarization on the middle 
class, or some other sector of the population, would be interesting. Just because the 
country as a whole is performing better economically does not necessarily mean that 
every person in the country is better off. It would be valuable to understand to what 
extent dollarization benefits, or hurts, certain groups of society. 
Anecdotal evidence has claimed that the poorest classes in El Salvador suffered 
the worst in the switch to the dollar.91 The argument is that since poorer members of 
society have less education and math skills, they were less likely to properly convert 
colónes to dollars. The exchange rate at the time of the switch was 8.75 colónes to 1 
dollar. With calculators not widely available and no conversion chart or table provided by 
the Salvadoran government, small business owners and individual citizens had to muddle 
through the conversion in their heads or on paper. To make the conversion math easier, 
merchants would just round up to the nearest whole number.92  
For example, a shopper on the day before dollarization buys 10 items at the store 
that each cost 8.75 colónes. The total bill would be 87.50 colónes. The very next day the 
store owner changes the prices to dollars, but uses a 9-to-1 conversion rate for 
simplicity’s sake. If the same shopper came in after dollarization looking for the same 10 
                                                 
91 “Ten Years Later: The Impact of Dollarization in El Salvador,” Voices on the Border: Information 
and Analysis from El Salvador, Posted June 8, 2011, https://voiceselsalvador.wordpress.com/2011/06/08/
ten-years-later-the-impact-of-dollarization-in-el-salvador/. 
92 Marla Dickerson, “In El Salvador, the Dollar Is No Panacea,” LA Times, August 4, 2007, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/aug/04/business/fi-dollarize4. 
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items it would cost $10 U.S., but the colón price would be 90 colónes (10x9). Due to the 
owner’s rounding, the cost of these 10 items increased by 2.50 colónes overnight. This is 
a form of inflation. All of the sudden the same citizen must spend more for every item 
purchased than before, all while earning the same income. When this sort of conversion is 
multiplied over many transactions, it is clear that the citizen will have less disposable 
income than before dollarization. In real terms, the citizen has less purchasing power and 
has effectively gotten poorer. 
Therefore, systematic research is needed to verify the extent of this instant 
inflation. Does it occur on a large scale or is it only a few isolated cases that are 
characterized as widespread occurrences? If this sort of rounding is commonplace, what 
can be done to mitigate it before a country adopts the dollar? Additionally, if rounding is 
happening extensively, how long will the diminished purchasing power effects linger? 
Along with that, how long does it take for wages to catch up to the new prices, if they 
ever do? Answers to these questions could help in smoothing the transition from a 
national currency to another currency, and could help various income groups to maintain 
their standard of living despite the change. 
Another potential area of research is, to what extent has the strength or weakness 
of the dollar affected dollarized countries? The general rule is that when a country’s 
currency is weak vis-à-vis other currencies its exports compete better in the world market 
because of their lower prices. Conversely, as the currency gains strength compared to 
other currencies, exports decline and imports increase due to the price differential. A 
country with its own currency and monetary policy can manipulate its world price to 
some extent. This manipulation can keep a country competitive in the world market. A 
dollarized country, however, cannot change the world price of its currency, but, instead, 
is subject to the world price of the dollar. Therefore, how much does a strong or weak 
dollar affect a particular dollarized country?  
It could be that a dollarized country does the majority of its trading with the 
United States and as a result would not feel many of the effects of a strong or weak 
dollar. That raises the question, what percentage of trade with the currency’s country of 
origin is needed for the effects of relative currency strength to be a moot point? In the 
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case of a dollarized country, if it traded exclusively with the United States, the effects of 
currency strength or weakness would be as if it were the 51st State. In other words, the 
effects would largely be transparent to that country. No country, however, trades 
exclusively with the United States. Therefore, at what level of trade are the effects of 
currency price changes negligible? 
A final area for further research could be dollarization as it relates to a country’s 
particular stage of economic development. There have been various theories of economic 
development put forth over the years. One of the more popular theories is the Porter 
Stage Theory. In this theory, Porter describes three distinct stages, and two transition 
stages in between the three stages, that a country could fall into. These three stages are 
the factor-driven economy, the investment-driven economy, and the innovation-driven 
economy. He claims that any economy must start at the first stage and move through the 
rest of the stages on its way to the final stage in a sequential manner.93  
Porter’s main idea is that a country must try to continuously increase its 
competitive position on a microeconomic level. In order to do this, a country must 
develop economically in multiple areas at the same time so that productivity can increase, 
thus enhancing the overall competitiveness of a country.94 Since Porter’s theory 
concentrates on productivity and microeconomic factors, macroeconomic factors are only 
important to the extent that they provide an advantageous business climate for the micro 
economy to continue developing. In other words, Porter argues that macroeconomic 
policies are necessary but not sufficient for a country’s long term wealth creation. 
Nevertheless, dollarization could be a macro policy that enhances the business climate 
and competitiveness of a particular economy. If a country decides it wants to pursue 
dollarization, at what stage in the Porter model should a country dollarize? What stage 
were countries in that have dollarized? 
                                                 
93 Michael E. Porter, “Enhancing the Microeconomic Foundations of Prosperity: The Current 
Competitiveness Index,” in World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2001–2002, eds. 
Klaus Schwab, Michael E. Porter, and Jeffrey D. Sachs (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002): 57–
58, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.476.4940&rep=rep1&type=pdf. 
94 Ibid., 55. 
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According to Porter’s stages, the investment-driven stage seems to make the most 
sense for when a country might want to dollarize. This is because in the investment-
driven stage countries want to build a national business environment that is efficient and 
allows heavy investment. The first stage—the factor-driven stage—does not seem like the 
time to switch currencies. In this stage the economy is still heavily reliant on labor-based 
jobs such as assembly, manufacturing, and resource extraction. Building a robust banking 
and financial system that encourages investment is not a focus in the first stage. 
Similarly, the third stage—the innovation-driven economy—seems as though it would be 
too late to switch to the dollar because by that stage the economy is already well 
developed, which suggests that dollarization would not be applicable.95 
Further research could concentrate on which stage of development is most 
appropriate for the transition to the dollar. Perhaps the second stage is the best time, but 
maybe the research would show a different answer. Given that a majority of countries are 
either in stage one or two, or in a transition stage, it would be valuable to identify which 
stage is the most advantageous stage to switch currencies.96 Maybe there is not an 
optimal stage; maybe a country could switch at any stage and reap benefits. Perhaps the 
research might show that dollarization has a negligible effect on a country’s stage 
progression; that would be an important finding as well, but diligent study in all of these 
areas is required for more complete answers. 
B. SUMMARY 
In the previous two case studies this thesis has examined some of the 
macroeconomic indicators of El Salvador and Ecuador in order to validate, or invalidate, 
the hypotheses discussed in the first chapter. Based on the data examined, the first 
hypothesis—dollarization has been a beneficial policy decision for El Salvador and 
Ecuador—has been validated. This thesis is not arguing that dollarization was the only 
reason the economies of both countries have performed well since their decision to 
                                                 
95 Porter, “Enhancing the Microeconomic Foundations of Prosperity,” 58. 
96 Klaus Schwab, The Global Competitiveness Report 2014–2015: Full Data Edition (Geneva, World 
Economic Forum, 2014),11, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2014-
15.pdf. 
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switch to the dollar. Nor is this thesis arguing that dollarization is a panacea. Obviously 
there are other important internal and external factors in any economy that will have an 
impact on overall performance. The world economy, and even the regional economy, can 
have huge impacts on individual economies. Natural disasters can cause shocks to a 
country’s economy. Furthermore, strength of institutions, property rights, and the rule of 
law all contribute to the business climate of a given country, which translates into 
economic growth or decline. Additionally, given the substantial trade that El Salvador 
and Ecuador do with the United States, their economies are intertwined with the U.S. 
economy and should mirror U.S. economic performance to some extent. Therefore, this 
thesis is simply arguing that the policy decision to dollarize has been beneficial for both 
countries.  
Interestingly, the two case study countries embarked on dollarization from 
different starting points, yet both had favorable outcomes. El Salvador had a fixed 
exchange rate through the 1990s, and the case study data shows that its once high 
inflation rate was already beginning to trend downward prior to dollarization. This 
reduction suggests, at least in part, that the economic policies, and other conditions, at the 
time were beginning to put El Salvador on a healthier economic path. Therefore, to say 
that the dollarization decision was purely an economic one is hard to prove. It seems as 
though the decision to dollarize was more of a calculated political decision by the 
ARENA party in an attempt to benefit party members and its supporters while 
marginalizing other political parties and their supporters. Regardless of the reason, 
though, dollarization has contributed to better economic performance for El Salvador vis-
à-vis its northern triangle neighbors and in comparison to its own prior performance.  
Similarly, Ecuador has benefitted from its controversial decision to dollarize. 
President Mahuad declared that his country would dollarize amid an atrocious economy 
that was only getting worse. The decision was not popular and contributed to his forced 
resignation shortly thereafter; nevertheless, Ecuador has benefitted from the switch to the 
dollar. Furthermore, many economists theorize that in order for a country to successfully 
dollarize that certain pre-conditions must be met before a successful transition can be 
undertaken. Some of these supposed requirements are a strong financial system, public 
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finances that demonstrate sound policies, and flexible labor markets.97 The Ecuador case, 
however, suggests that these ingredients are not necessarily needed for a successful 
transition to the dollar. Ecuador was in the midst of a banking crisis and dangerously near 
an economic collapse when it transitioned. That is a far cry from a strong financial 
system and sound government policies that some say are needed. Instead, Ecuador’s 
dollarization experience gives evidence for the theory that a country should dollarize first 
and then other positive economic changes will follow necessarily.98 Should other Latin 
American countries consider dollarization? 
Since the hypothesis is true that El Salvador and Ecuador have benefitted from 
dollarization, what are the implications for other countries—specifically Latin American 
countries? The first is that a country does not necessarily have to wait until it has a strong 
financial system or good immediate economic policies in order to dollarize. Ecuador 
shows that dollarization can come first. Second, a country need not have a deteriorating 
economy in order to dollarize. El Salvador shows that a country with a relatively good 
economy can transition and improve its macroeconomic indicators even more. The third 
is that dollarization is not a magic bullet that will take a mediocre economy and transform 
it into a strong economy overnight. Furthermore, a singular policy, such as dollarization, 
must be combined with other sensible policies to reap the full benefits of switching to the 
dollar. The El Salvador case shows that dollarization, along with other policies, has 
contributed to solid economic performance. In fact, it has helped El Salvador outperform 
its northern triangle neighbors in many respects. Ecuador, alternatively, has continued to 
pursue loose government spending policies which creates debt, resulting in dampened 
effects from dollarization. Available data in the Ecuador chapter shows that Ecuador 
benefitted from the switch to the dollar; however, since the initial correction to bring its 
economy into line with its Andean neighbors, it has not significantly or consistently 
outperformed them from a macroeconomic perspective. Therefore, the idea that 
dollarization can offset the effect of other detrimental economic policies is not true, but 
dollarization coupled with other sound policies can be a potent recipe for success. 
                                                 
97 Jacome, “The Late 1990s Financial Crisis in Ecuador,” 8. 
98 Ibid., 8. 
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In sum, this thesis has demonstrated that El Salvador and Ecuador have benefited 
from the decision to dollarize. Both countries were in different economic conditions 
when they dollarized, but both have seen favorable macroeconomic numbers as a result 
of the change. A reduction and stabilization in inflation in both countries was probably 
the most significant outcome of dollarization for both. It has been just over 15 years since 
the two decided to switch; time will tell if dollarization continues to reap benefits for both 
countries. Without other sound macroeconomic policies—or even microeconomic 
reforms as Porter would argue—dollarization alone will probably not provide the long 
term benefits hoped for. A commitment to responsible government spending, however, in 
areas that provide positive returns on investment and policies that help improve the 
overall productivity of the national economy should complement dollarization nicely. 
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